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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. GRANT COOK, ) 
BRIEF 
Appellant ) 
vs. ) 
CAROL L. COOK, ) 
CASE NO. 20165 
Respondent ) 
COMES NOW the defendant/respondent, Carol L. Cook, and 
submits the following brief in the above entitled case. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case below was a divorce proceeding. This appeal is from 
proceedings and actions taken to enforce the divorce decree. 
II. DISPOSITION MADE BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
The District Court, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, 
District Judge, on May 25, 1984 executed a "Judicial Deed and 
Transfer of Parties Interest in Real Estate" and a "Judicial 
Release of Notice of Lien". After hearing the plaintiff/appel-
lant's Order To Show Cause why the Court should not declare the 
Judicial Deed and Release of Lien void, held on July 6, 1984, the 
court entered findings of fact and an order on August 3, 1984 at 
R. 293-295, denying the appellant's request and approving the 
Court appointed "masters" accounting. 
III. FACTS 
A. Disagreement with appellant's statement of facts. The 
respondent does not agree with the appellant's statement of the 
facts in the following particulars: 
1. The trial Court did not find by its Memorandum Decision, 
R. 69-72, or its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, R. 104-113, and Supplemental Decree, R. 114-118, that the 
value of the parties' assets was as stated at Page 2 of the 
appellant's brief. Particularly regarding the Trailer Court at 
Willard, Utah and the construction equipment, which are the assets 
involved in this appeal. The Court only determined the divergence 
between the values claimed by each of the parties. As a result of 
the "wide divergence" the Court was unable to make a finding of 
value. The Court's inability to make a finding of value is one of 
the principal reasons why the Court did not divide the assets in 
kind. See second part of Paragraph J, Page 2, Memorandum Decision 
at R. 70. 
2. The respondent does not agree that the Court appointed 
Gary Bywater of Brigham Realty, hereinafter referred to as Mr. 
Bywater, as a "receiver" in the strictest sense of the term. Mr. 
Bywater was appointed to sell the parties' property, R. 71, and by 
necessary implication, R. 72, and as later accepted by the 
parties, R. 92-93, to manage the Trailer Park until sold. The 
Court agreed on September 8, 1983, R. 92-93, that Mr. Bywater 
would be a "special master" for that purpose. The respondent does 
not think that the distinction in the title attached to Mr. 
Bywater has any significance because his responsibilities and 
authorities are setforth in the terms of the Memorandum Decision 
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and the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Supplemental Decree. 
3. The offers to purchase the parties' Trailer Park by the 
appellant were not all rejected by Mr. Bywater or not approved by 
the Court, as stated at Page 3 of the appellant's brief. 
4. The respondent did not submit her offer to Judge 
Christoffersen for his approval as stated at Page 4 of the 
appellant's brief. The offer was submitted for approval by Mr. 
Bywater. 
B. Facts as claimed by respondent. In this action, the 
relevant facts are as follows: 
1. On or about April 4, 1982, the appellant filed a complaint 
for divorce against the respondent, R. 1-2. An answer and 
counterclaim was filed by the respondent on May 4, 1982, R. 3-5. 
The respondent also filed an Affidavit in Support of Order To Show 
Cause and Restraining Order on May 4, 1982, R. 6-7. The parties 
had been married approximately thirty-two (32) years and had 
raised four (4) children. The protractive proceedings that 
followed reflected the bitterness and difficulty people sometimes 
face in managing and dividing marital property which has been 
accumulated over such a long period. See numerous Affidavits for 
Order To Show Cause and proceedings contained in record. 
2. The Court on August 23, 1982, pursuant to hearing on July 
6, 1982, entered a Temporary Order, R. 16-17, which among other 
things directed that the respondent be placed in the position of 
manager of the parties' Mobile Home Park. 
3. Trial of this case, the Honorable Omer J. Call, District 
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Judge, presiding, was finally held on March 21, 1983, eleven 
months after it was filed. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
Court granted the parties a divorce and took under advisement the 
division of properties, R. 54-55, and "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law", R. 64-66 and a "Decree", R. 67-68, were 
entered. 
4. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision, R. 69-72, 
hereinafter referred to as "the memorandum decision", on May 27, 
1983 providing for division of the parties properties. Supple-
mental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 104-113, and 
Supplemental Decree, rec. p. 114-118, hereinafter referred to 
jointly as the Supplemental Findings and Decree, were entered 
pursuant to the Memorandum Decision. Neither the Memorandum 
Decision nor the Supplemental Findings and Decree were appealed 
and they are not the subject of this appeal. They do have a 
bearing upon the Court's actions under consideration in this 
appeal. 
5. The parties were unable, within thirty (30) days to reach 
a mutual agreement pursuant to the Memorandum Decision, to appoint 
a real estate broker or other sales agent, or for either of the 
parties to purchase part or all of the assets, or for division in 
kind, and Mr. Bywater proceeded to attempt to sell the parties 
properties as directed by the Memorandum Decision, 
6. The Memorandum Decision and the appointment of Mr. 
Bywater to sell the parties property did not solve the problems 
between them. Judge Call held numerous hearings after issuing the 
Memorandum Decision, see: (a) Minute Entry, R. 92, held pursuant 
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to the respondent's "Affidavit in Support of Order To Show Cause 
in Re Contempt and For Modification", R. 73-75; (b) Minute Entry, 
p. 138, held pursuant to the respondent's "Affidavit In Support Of 
Order To Show Cause In Re Contempt And For An Injunction", R. 
125-127, and the "Order For Injunction And Restraining Order", R. 
128-130, issued pursuant to said hearing; (c) Minute Entry, p. 
166-168, held pursuant to respondent's "Affidavit In Support Of 
Order To Show Cause In Re Contempt", R. 154-157, whereat the Court 
found the appellant in contempt and further directed an Order 
transferring certain property sold by Mr. Bywater. 
7. On March 14, 1984, the appellant made a Motion to 
disqualify Judge Call, R. 191, said Motion was supported by 
Affidavit of Prejudice, R. 192-194. 
8. The case was assigned to District Judge VeNoy 
Christoffersen, who held a hearing on March 23, 1984, pursuant to 
the respondent's "Verified Petition For Order To Show Cause To 
Approve Sale Of Property And/Or Distribute Property In Kind And 
For An Accounting And Determination Of Motion To Modify Memorandum 
Decision", R. 181-184, see: Minute Entry, R. 205. At that hearing 
the parties stipulated in open Court that each party would have a 
thirty (30) day period to buy the Trailer Park for One Hundred 
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) cash. The appellant 
to have the first thirty days and upon his failure to so purchase, 
the respondent then had a thirty day option. 
9. The appellant made an offer on March 23, 1984, to 
purchase the parties remaining personal property for Sixty-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($64,200.00). Mr. Bywater and the 
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respondent both accepted said offer and their acceptance w< 
communicated to the appellant by a letter of April 3f 1984r sei 
by Mr, Bywater. See: transcript P. 25, line 11 through P. 2S 
line 2. Also see: plaintiff's Exhibit 4 offered at July 6, 198 
hearing, a copy of the Offer and Acceptance attached to thi; 
Brief, marked Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part hereof, foi 
clarity. 
10 . The appellant did not submit an offer to purchase the 
parties Mobile Home Park for One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($175,000.00) cash, as pointed out by the appellant in his 
t 
brief, however, the appellant did file with the Court, on April 
16, 1984, various documents which apparently he considered an 
offer. See: R. 217-221, also R. 223-233. 
11. The respondent submitted her offer on April 24, 1984, to 
purchase the Mobile Home Park for One Hundred Seventy-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00). The purchase price was to be paid 
by her offsetting the sums she was to receive from the appellant 
from his purchase of the equipment and the balance due the 
appellant was to be paid in cash. See: R. 241. Mr. Bywater 
submitted the respondent's offer to Judge Christoffersen on April 
25, 1984 for his acceptance and the Judge noted his acceptance at 
the bottom of the front page. 
12. The appellant on April 30, 1984, filed a document 
captioned "Rejection of Sale of Construction Equipment" and 
apparently at the same time left a copy with Mr. Bywater's 
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secretary. R. 222. Also see: transcript P. 34, line 17 through 
line 24. 
13. On or about May 18, 1984, the respondent's financing was 
approved. R. 242. Mr. Bywater, in order to close the sale, 
obtained the Judicial Deed Transferring Parties Interest In Real 
Estate, and the Judicial Release of Notice of Liens from Judge 
Christoffersen on or about May 25, 1984.' The sale of the parties 
properties closed thereafter and funds were disbursed to the 
appellant's attorney by letter of June, 7, 1984, from Mr. Bywater. 
R. 265. 
14. The appellant thereafter obtained an Order To Show Cause 
hearing which was held on July 6, 1984, requesting the Court to 
set aside the Judicial Deed and Release of Liens. At said hearing, 
a rather lengthy discussion between the Court and counsel, and 
review of the file, was had. See: transcript P.3 through P. 33. 
After said discussion and review of the file, the appellant was 
sworn and testified. See: transcript P. 33 through end. 
15. On August 3, 1984, the Court entered "Findings of Fact 
and Order on Motion and Order To Show Cause", denying the 
appellant's request to set aside the Judicial Deed and Release of 
Liens. R. 293-295. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The burden is upon the appellant to establish that the 
findings and order of the trial court clearly preponderate against 
the evidence and that the trial court has abused its discretion or 
-7-
misapplied principles of law. Although the proceedings in th 
case are equitable in nature, considerable deference should 
given to the findings and order of the trial court due to it 
advantageous position. The sale of the parties property an 
division of proceeds are not so inequitable so as to constitute a 
abuse of discretion. The sale of the parties property was withii 
the terms and provisions of the original divorce decree and Judge 
Christoffersenfs approval of the sale of the parties property was 
not a modifiction of the original decree. The lower court's 
findings and order were merely an enforcement of the court's 
original decree. The lower court entered findings of fact and and 
order after hearing, where ample opportunity was given to the 
appellant to present his arguments and evidence regarding transfer 
of the parties property, and further, said hearing was at a 
meaningful stage of the proceedings and therefore, did not deny 
the appellant due process. 
V. ARGUMENT 
Point I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE LOWER COURT'S 
"FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ON MOTION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE" ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT "THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO THE APPELLEE AND THE 
DIVISION OF THE PROCEEDS IS SO INEQUITABLE SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION". 
Divorce orders and Findings of Fact are endowed with 
presumption of validity, and the burden is on the appellant to 
show they are in error. Stone v Stone, 431 P.2d 802, 803 (Utah 
1967). In a divorce case, even though the proceedings are 
equitable and the Court may review the evidence, the lower courts 
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gives considerable deference to the findings and judgment of the 
trial Court due to its advantageous position. Fletcher v 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, on 
appeal, the Supreme Court will not disturb the action of the trial 
Court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, 
or the trial Court has abused its discretion or misapplied 
principles of law. Fletcher, Supra, at 1222. 
Appellant apparently claims that the division of the marital 
property by the lower Court is inequitable. That claim is based 
on the premise that the proceeds of the sale of the marital assets 
were "no where near equal to what the appellant was originally 
awarded." See appellant's brief, P. 6. In support of his claim, 
appellant has presented the theory that he should have received 
One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($148,000.00) rather than 
Forty-Four Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy One Dollars and 
Thirty-Three Cents ($44,771.33) and some construction equipment. 
Appellant's approach to his calculation of the value of the 
marital property is "split the difference". That is, appellant 
has arrived at his One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars 
($148,000.00) claim by supposedly valuing the property at the mean 
of the proposed values found at the time of the original decree of 
divorce. (For those values see R. 69, 70.) Appellant fails to 
recognize that his theory is based on values that were little more 
than guess work by the parties. Those original values were only 
estimates made by the parties, rather than solid definite numbers 
set on the two assets, and were listed by the Court to show the 
divergence in value. In fact, when appellant himself, eventually 
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made a offer to purchase the construction equipment, his offer wa 
for only Sixty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Forty Dollar; 
($64,240.00), some Eleven Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00) less thar 
the bottom figure in the memorandum decision of the trial court. 
Appellant now demands that the Court remand the case, based upon 
what is not an unfair distribution, but rather an incorrect 
original estimate of value. In reality, appellant is asking this 
Court to value the equipment at the higher cost than the appellant 
himself did when purchasing the same equipment. 
Appellant further fails to recognize that respondent's own 
assets are also less than what she should have received if the 
mean value could have been obtained. When the expected values 
were not met, respondent also lost an expected higher return on 
the division of the property. 
At no time in appellant's brief is it contended that 
respondent received a greater share of the assets tnan did the 
appellant. Nor is it contended that appellant will receive more 
money if a greater value is gained by a resale of the construction 
equipment. In fact, it was appellant who place the Sixty-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Forty Dollars ($64,240.00) value on the 
construction equipment when he bought it. Does he not think that 
he will bid higher the next time the equipment is placed on sale? 
Or that the lower Court should somehow reimburse the difference 
between the anticipated value and the actual value on sale? 
Such statements point out that the basis of this appeal is 
for reasons other than that the lower Court abused its discretion. 
Appellant's real claim is that the actual value of his divided 
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marital property is less than originally anticipated. The only 
claim which this Court could consider would have been that the 
final division of the property was inequitable because one party 
received more than the other. However, both parties received 
one-half of the actual realized value. Respondent submits that 
the trial Court decision should not be substituted or disturbed by 
this Court on appeal, due to appellant's disappointment in not 
getting more money. 
Point II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION APPROVING THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY TO THE RESPONDENT 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE "SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO THE APPELLEE IS 
CONTRARY TO THE PARTIES DIVORCE DECREE, PREVIOUS ORDERS OF THE 
COURT, AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE FINDINGS." 
In appellant's second argument, appellant advances the claim 
that while rhe lower court was purporting to clarify the decree, 
the lower ccart substantially changed the terms of the original 
decree of divorce in regard to the property division. The 
changes, as claimed by the appellant, were that the original 
decree required the parties to receive cash, while the later order 
by Judge Christoffersen allowed an in kind purchase, rather than a 
total cash sale. 
The original decree, as entered by Judge Call, stated that 
Mr. Bywater, upon appointment should sell all the real property 
and construction equipment either for cash or on terms (with 
certain guidelines for the terms setforth). R. 71. 
As Mr. Bywater was unable to sell the property for cash, 
after having given thirty days allowance to appellant to pay cash 
(for One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00)) an 
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alternate method of sale was made to respondent. That is 
respondent was able to purchase the real property by using as muc 
cash as was necessary to complete the total division of th 
properties between the parties. 
If appellantfs desires of having a cash settlement would have 
actually transpired, it would have meant that respondent would 
have given a check to appellant, whereas, immediately, appellant 
would have turned a portion of that check back to respondent. 
Rather, instead of such measures, Mr. Bywater made the sale 
without the transfer of checks. He merely calculated the offer 
made by appellant for the purchase of the construction equipment 
as against balances owing appellant, and had respondent deliver 
checks for the difference. (See T. 44-47) 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine division of 
properties. It is the prerogative of the court to make whatever 
disposition of property as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary 
for the protection and welfare of the parties. See: Fletcher, 
Supra 1222. 
In this case, Judge Call made a decree calling either for a 
cash sale or a sale on terms. Appellant's main argument is that 
Judge Christoffersen overruled and/or modified Judge Call!s 
decision of a pure cash sale. However, such a narrow interpre-
tation of Judge Call's decision allows no room for any settlement 
other than "total cash" and avoids the fact that the sale, as it 
transpired, was totally allowable under the conditions set by 
Judge Call. As Judge Call's initial decree allowed for a sale on 
terms or a cash sale, respondent submits that Judge Christoffersen 
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vas merely making the decision on events as they related to the 
earlier order of Judge Call. Judge Christoffersen explicitly 
stated that he was only carrying out what was earlier ordered, in 
accordance with Judge Call's decision. (Transcript P. 44, lines 
8-18.) His findings was that a sale had occurred, which was 
basically a cash sale. (Transcript, P. 46, lines 20-25, Transcript 
P. 47, lines 1-7; R. 293-95.) 
Appellant's argument is that Judge Christoffersen made a non 
cash sale by his decision. Respondent submits that Judge 
Christoffersen merely found, after evidence and arguments of 
counsel for both parties, that a "cash sale" had been effectuated. 
Additionally, assuming, arguendo, that if this case were to be 
remanded, it would merely mean that respondent and appellant would 
exchange checks. Respondent would give appellant a check for the 
purchase of the mobile home park and appellant would give 
respondent a check for 1) the purchase of the construction 
equipment and 2) moneys to cover respondent's portion of her 
equity in the mobile home park. 
It should be noted that the appellant does not claim that he 
did not purchase the construction equipment or that he in any way 
was prejudiced by the acceptance of his offer for the purchase of 
the construction period. His only claim in that regard merely is 
that the respondent has somehow "hoisted" the equipment upon the 
appellant. No showing of insufficiency of the purchase price of 
the equipment is alleged or argued. Furthermore, appellant in no 
way contends that such a purchase of the construction equipment 
did not take place. 
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Appellant seeks to alter the lower court decision by a clai 
that is totally without justification. Any remedy the appellant 
seeks is meaningless to the parties, and is totally unreasonable. 
No change would occur in the respective positions of the parties 
if this case were to be remanded. 
The claim that no cash sale occurred as required is totally 
based on mere technicalities. No showing of actual prejudice or 
iniquity is present. See Humphreys v Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 
(Utah 1974) . 
Additionally, there has been no modification through the 
guise of clarifying language. Appellant cites Crofts v Crofts, 
445 P.2d 701 (Utah 1968) as authority for the theory that a 
modification* took place. However, Judge Christoffersen merely 
ruled that the actions of the sale were correct and consistent by 
the terms setforth in Judge Call's original decree. Nowhere does 
any modification of the original decree take place. Any reliance 
on the fact that Crofts should be controlling in this matter is 
unwarranted due to the fact that Crofts involved a situation where 
a Judge proposed to interpret a judgment in the event of the 
occurrence of certain contingencies. (See Crofts, Supra at 702.) 
This case involved an actual dispute and a decision that the 
actions of the sale were consistent with the terms of the original 
divorce decree. 
Appellant's demands for remand in this case should be denied 
due to the fact that findings were made that were consistent with 
the original divorce decree, and that any remand would be 
meaningless as to altering the positions of the parties. 
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Point III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE LOWER COURT'S 
"FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ON MOTION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE" ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT "THE LOWER COURT DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW." 
In depriving a person of life, liberty or property, the 
requirements of due process are: 1) The existence of an appropri-
ate tribunal; 2) An inquiry into the merits of the question 
presented? 3) Notice of the process of the inquiry; 4) Opportunity 
to appear in person or by counsel; 5) Fair opportunity to be 
heard; 6) Judgment rendered in the record thus made. State In 
Interest Of L. G. W. , 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). Due process 
is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 
1980). 
In the matter now before the Court, respondent submits that 
1) Ample opportunity was given for the appellant to present 
arguments and evidence regarding the transfer of appellant's 
property and 2) the events and terms of the sale require that 
immediate action take place so that the sale would occur. 
Appellant, in this appeal, is claiming that his due process 
rights were violated by the sale of the mobile home park to the 
respondent. What the appellant fails to recognize is that 
appellant previously had notice that the property was going to be 
transferred. Indeed, that is what the whole divorce action is all 
about. Appellant now seeks to claim a "due process" argument 
while in reality only objecting to the terms of the sale. 
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In this matter, both appellant and respondent had notice that 
the property was going to be altered or transferred. The original 
decree of divorce did that. R. 70, 71. And when the Court's 
agent, Mr. Bywater, did make the sale, it can hardly be said that 
the appellant had no notice that such was going to occur. Indeed, 
it had been known for months. The appellant's contention that his 
property was taken without notice is entirely without merit. 
Respondent submits that appellant's real claim is that he 
objected to the results of the sale that eventually took place, 
that is, that the property was sold to the respondent and not to 
the appellant. Appellant is merely trying to elevate his 
displeasure at respondent getting the property into some constitu-
tional argument of failure to have due process. Appellant, if 
really concerned that his property was to be taken and to the 
manner it was going to be taken, should have objected and 
presented arguments when the original decree of divorce was 
entered. That was the time that the Court gave notice of its 
intention to sell the mobile home park so as to make a division of 
the property between the parties. 
In an analysis of a procedure an important fact is the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest to the parties, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards. Worrall, Supra 602. 
Even though appellant knew that the property was going to be 
sold so as to make a division of the property between the parties, 
appellant is now contending that he needed further safeguards to 
protect his interests. That is, if you carry appellant's 
-16-
arguments to its logical conclusions, appellant was requesting 
that he approve and be privy to all sales transactions, even 
though the court had appointed a special master to conduct such 
business. However, assuming, arguendo, that the safeguards were 
not there, how could appellant have been damaged? 
The sale of the subject property to the respondent fulfilled 
all of the terms of the original decree of divorce. Additionally, 
appellant present no argument or factual basis in his brief that 
he was damaged by the sale as it occurred. Rather, he grasps at 
purported constitutional arguments to somehow avert the sale 
because it ultimately became the property of the respondent, and 
not his own. Judge Christoffersen made explicit findings that the 
sale was proper in all respects and that the court appointed 
master, Mr. Bywater, had the authority to make the sale as he did. 
See R. 294. 
Although appellant maintains that his property rights were 
terminated without notice or opportunity to be heard until after 
the property was sold, such claims are merely a ploy so as to 
allow appellant one last chance to purchase the property and gain 
total ownership of the property, rather than letting respondent 
own the same. 
Nowhere in appellant's brief does it setforth any factual 
basis that appellant would have received more moneys if additional 
notice of the hearing were given prior to the court's approval of 
the sale, and nowhere does it specify that any additional amounts 
would have been received if appellant could have been privy to the 
sales transaction. As such, appellant has failed to either prove 
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that any notice or opportunity would have afforded him an} 
additional safeguards, or that a different result might have 
occurred. See Worall, Supra 602. 
Additionally, the sales transaction as it occurred did not 
allow for the court appointed master to obtain the approval of all 
parties concerned in regard to the sale. Respondent's offer was 
severely limited in its duration by a condition placed by the 
financial institution upon the availability of credit and a 
closing date. Therefore, the court appointed master was required 
to move as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter give 
opportunity to the appellant to present any objections to the 
terms of the sale. Such was done, on the 6th day of July, 1984, 
and the Court having heard the arguments and evidence of the 
appellant, thereafter issued its findings of fact and decree that 
the sale that transpired, was in accordance with the original 
divorce decree, and was valid in all respects. See R. 293-295. 
Respondent maintains that appellant is not presenting due 
process arguments because of some alleged damage that was done to 
respondent, but however, appellant is pursuing the constitutional 
argument to somehow avert the sale and have one last possible 
chance at purchasing the property for himself. As pointed out 
above, due process is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content, but is flexible and requires such procedural protections 
as a particular situation demands. Respondent submits that in 
this situation, the lower court met all the requirements made for 
notice and opportunity of both parties to be heard regarding the 
sale and the terms of the sale, and thus having been made, 
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respondent respectfully submits that the lower court's decision 
should not be disturbed or remanded for further proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is insufficient evidence in the record to justify this 
Court substituting its findings and judgment for the lower courts 
which was in a superior position to resolve the dispute between 
the parties. The appellant was also afforded his due process 
rights as required. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
District Court's orders and actions and dismiss this appeal. 
Dated this 18th day of January, 1985. 
I si Jack H. Molgard 
Jack H. Molgard 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing document to:Dale F. Gardiner, 1325 South Main 
Street, Suite 201, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
Dated this ^ ^> day of January , 1985. 
/s/ Connie J. Simcox 
Secretary 
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EXHIBIT MA" 
April 3, 1984 
Mr, Grant Cook 
1140 ?6th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
We are enclosing the accounting statement for March, 1984 and also a 
shhet on financing from Wasatch Mortgage that you maylind helpful if 
you need an financing-
Carol Cook has accepted the offer on the Park and Equipmeat. If we 
can answer any other questions for you or if you need additional 
information, feel free to contact our office* 
Sincerely, 
Gary Bywater 
Brighatn Realty Inc. 
REALTOR 
GB/fc 
Encl^t 
ThK may oe d jeyanj ~. _ 
r Name of Broker C o m p a n y ' ' r 
'jL'-.Cl/±-. Utah. / ^ ^ 
I N C O N S I D E R A T I O N OF your agreement t o use your e f f o r t s to p i * sent th is of fer t o the Sel ler, l /we 
depos i t w i t h y o u as earnest m o n e y the sum of ($ , . ) 
o r m o f 
(Pro~ J^ C^O^C 
* S J V 
. D O H A R S 
O  O? -y* y» ~^mmm -JT" ' • ^ " J J ••» J * 
re a n d apo|*-<pn the p u r c h a s e / j f the p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e d at . . v i — f .^fL-J^ JLU-JZJLZ **yr — . / - X ^ . iSr ' J^lr> ~?—"?, j s * 3 — 
^LU ^ JtZZ^TL _ _ • • 
SZ / / / ?r City /fcyy^ y ^AnZ*^ C o t t f t y , State o f . yy^z: d i n g any of the f o l l o w m g i t ems If at present a t t ached t o the premises P l u m b i n g and heat ing f i x t u res and e q u i p m e n t i n c l u d i n g s toker and o i l t anks , water heaters and burners e lec t r t r 
f i x t u r e s e x c l u d i n g bu lbs , b a t h r o o m f i x t u r e s , ro l le r shades, c u r t a i n rods a n d f i x t u res , Venetian b l i nds , w i n d o w and doo r screens, l i n o l e u m , all shrubs and trees and any other f i x t u i * s 
y?T~-~yy< y* s y .-; <0t 
c r 
£• IS <* S? " . z: i r ^ a w m g ^ e i K o n a l a i ^ p e r t y shal l also hey/c^/ f ided as part f\ t he prooj t f r ty purchased y / _ ^ ^/J- —d 
The t o t a l p 11 h i < pn< f < f 1 f 
be payabt t l  le as f o l l o w s $ 
f
 t r w h e n seller approves sale $ 
» w h i c h shal l be on m n . i - >< / 
y ? sf ^ 
/4>y PI 
ich represents the a fo re / f i c i r ib^ff depos i t , receipt 
& S AJoT^c/ a 
of w h i c h is hereby a c k n o w l e d g e d by y o u 
on de l i ve ry of deed or f ina l con t rac t o f 
ing 1 __ .-cCr.pAf y~^—7^2 ^V-7r*7—7--4sT&*™"c" 
&/<Sfs^ CjT.€-Zl.J?L-C£ JZJ1 O^/i^^l-
n t i l the l i . i l . in tc of $ together w i t h interest is p a i d , provide <1 !> »wi v< r Ih »t buyer at his o p t i o n , at any t i m e , may pay a m o u n t s in exc ess of t h t m o n t h l y 
l y m c n t u p o n thr u n p a i d balaut c, subjet t to tht l m i t t 11 j i* 1 f mtr K I t iv l l u buy* 1 hert m a s s u i m d Interest at l o pt t 1 tit 1 t the i i p u d p t t i 1, t i l t h * 
urchase p r u t t o be i n c l u d e d in t h e prescr ibed p a y m e n t s and shall begin as of dat t of possession w h i c h shall be on or be fo re A l l r isk o f loss and tjt s t ru t t i on 
>f p r o p e r t y , a n d expenses of insurance shall be b o m bv the seller u n t i l date of possession at w h i c h t i m e p r o p e r t y taxes, rents , insurance, interest and o ther expenses of the p r o p e r t y shall be 
j r o i a t e d as of date o f possession A l l o the i taxes and all assessments mortgages cha t te l hens and other hens, encumbrances or charges against the p r o p e r t y of any na tu re shall be pa id by 
th t sr II* t ' K< < pt A _ ,, 
" ' " ^ '» i u i i l m i | i i n v i i n p » t s H I i i i t l u d e d in this sale St wer [ j ( o n n u c l c d [_ ) . Sept i t 1 ank a n d / o r Cesspool [ } , S idewa lk [ " ] . Cu rb m d t , u t t e r (" 
] ' I ' " 1 - 1 1 •««• t t u i t i t i ng [ j t u l m a r y Wi te r (( i t y [ ] Other C o m m u n i t y Sys tem [^  ] , Connec t ! <1 [ } P n v i f e f ] ) ( Legend Yes (x ) N o (o) 
Contract of Sale or Insfnmir i»t of < onveyance to be made oi> the approved form of tho l i tah Oept. of Business Regulation in the name of 
Special Street Paving 
_days f r o m Mi te hen of and unless s ) 
I i l l 11 ( * p t i o n of t h t seller, 
1 his p a y m e n t is received and o f fe r is made subject t o the w r i t t e n acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon w i t h i n 
a p p r o v e d the r e t u r n o f the m o n e y here in rece ip ted shall t a n c c l th is o f fer w i t h o u t damage to the unders igned agent 
In th t event the purchaser fai ls ft) pay tht balance of said por t hase prrce or 1 omp fe te said purchase as here in p m v i d i d t l i 1 l 1 J 
be re ta ined »s l i q u i d a t e d a n d agreed damages 
It is u n d e r s t o o d a n d agreed tha t the te rms w r i t t e n in th is rece ipt c o n s t i t u t e the en t i re P re l im ina ry Con t rac t be tween the purchaser and the seller, and tha t no verbal < t a t e m t n t made by 
anyone r t l a t i v e to this t ransac t ion strait be c o n s t r u e d to be a part of th is t ransac t ion unless in* o r p o r a t e d in a n t i n g here in I t is f u r t he r agreed tha t e x e c u t i o n of the f ina l con t rac t shall 
abrogate th is Tamest M o n e y Receipt and Of fe r t o Purchase 
Hroker ( o m p a n y 
W d hereby agree t o car ry ou t and f u l f i l l the te rms and c o n d i t i o n s spec i f ied above , and the st Iter agrees t o f u rn i sh g » xt j <d m a r l e t i b l e t i t l e w i t h abst ract b rough t to date or at Seller s 
i o p t i o n a po l i cy of t i t l e insurance m thr name of the purchaser and to make f ina l conveyance by w a r r a n t y deed or 
7 in the event of salt of other than
 M ,| p r o p e r t y , seller w i l l p rov ide ev idence of t i t l e or r ight to sell or I. ase If e i ther pa r t y fails so to d o , he agrees to pay al l « xpenses of e n f o r c i n g th.s aaree 
8 mmi t or of any r ight ar is ing ou t of tht b ieach the reo f , i n c l u d i n g a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s fee 
g I ht st Ik t rqit t s t >ider, i t ion of the t f f o r t s of the agent in p r o c u r i n g i purchaser , t o pay said agent < rmission of 
0 to tht < v t u t st Her has t nt< i t U i n t o 1 u t i ng contr i< t w i t h m y other agent and said con t rac t is present ly e f fec t i ve , th is paragraph w i l l be of no force or e f fec t 
V 
l-sj/ 
So 
A S s> 
/ c / ~ ' ^ U /S~ 
"' , / . ^<rjOO^-
-• y 
/^> 
0>'oS C\ << 
*^;~ Jir^/^ i^'/l J » €* 
-r-/u e ft*" 
•J0 
y 
A.** y y y * ** / 
b 3 <St «««• I »w M ' ( | U I I < , i m i M rs to l i m n ft t op i * s of this t onJr.it » be i n . 
I at know le t t t | f receipt of i fit 
Mler Date -^y^M^o^L. #kj^ 
5 6 I persona l ly t a u s f d 1 I H U I copy of th t forego. , .g agreement b e w m g i l l 1 n i l u t t s t In i i i u l i d i thr f~ ] , ( | | f r f J Purchaser 
5 / .—„ 19 . by M q i s t e i t d ma i l a n d r e t u r n re t t tpt 1 it tat tit d here to 
58 Broker 
